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hand, which is our standard practice. And then perhaps we l,vould 
have avoided some of the inconvenience. 
But more than anything, I will remind the minority member that 
the majority has every right to invite or not invite anybody that 
they want to. And I would appreciate your supporting a majority 
witness, but in this case, we were simply exercismg the rights that 
we already have. 
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
In the interests of fairness and due process and all of the values 
that the House Judiciary Committee portends to protect, I respect 
the response of the chairman only to say that laymen who typically 
are not proficient at testifying before committees may have any 
number of reasons to delay or have delayed testimony. In fact, I 
have been before many witnesses whose testimony appeared on my 
desk right as they began to speak. 
I would only indicate and say that I would rather another pen-
alty for individuals as opposed to denial of testimony, because we 
have every right to cross-examine their testimony if it was not in 
the keeping and liking of any of us who might have invited them. 
I only ask again for that, and I appreciate the fact that you have 
given a response, 
Mr. SMITH. Thank you. ' 
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the chairman. 
Mr. SMITH. We will welcome our third panel today, consisting of 
Professor David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center; and 
Mrs. Nahla AI-Arian, a relative of an affected individual who is 
being held-in detention. 
We welcome you both, and Professor Cole, if you will begin by 
giving us your testimony. 
I 
STATEMENT OF DAVID COLE, PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN 
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 
Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 
holding this hearing and for inviting me to testifY. 
We heard a lot in the prior panel about national security and 
threats to national security. And of course, when the FBI General 
Counsel gets up and talks about threats to national security, it is 
very hard for us to question that. And when questions are raised, 
and he says, well, I am not at liberty to talk about specific cases, 
it gets more difficult to challenge the claim. 
But I think the claim can be challenged, and I am here to do 
that. First, I want to look at what Mr. Alexander's testimony basi-
cally was, which is, despite the broad authority that you have given 
us, or that we have interpreted you to give us, we in fact only use 
this procedure where there are true threats to national security, 
where the alien poses a true threat to national security. . 
In other words, trust us. You give us this big authority, but we 
will only use it in narrow cases. 
But then he says, there are 12 currently pending cases in which 
aliens pose a true threat to national security. It has been deter-
mined at the highest levels that they pose a true threat to national 
security. ' 
But then he also tells us that only five of those aliens are being 
detained by INS. So INS, in the highest levels of justice, has de-
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cided that seven aliens pose a true threat to national security, and 
nonetheless are free and at large in this country. Now, if they real-
ly posed a threat to national necurity, would the INS be allowing 
them out, free, at large? No, they would be detained. 
So I think that, just from the current pending cases, suggests 
some reason to question what they say. 
Now, I want to talk about the past a little bit. I have represented 
, 13 people in the last 13 years against whom the INS has sought 
to use secret evidence. And the INS' track record in these cases be-
lies Mr. Parkinson's general assurances that this power will be 
used only for true threats to national security. 
That was the argument that the INS made in all 13 cases at one 
time. They were all alleged to be threats to national security. Yet 
in no case did the secret evidence charge that any of these individ-
uals engaged in or supported any criminal conduct, much less 
criminal conduct that would threaten national security. In every 
case, the basic charge was guilt by association. 
Twelve of those 13 people who the INS said posed direct threats 
to national security are now living freely and peaceably in the 
United States, without, as far as I can tell, any undermining of the 
national security. The thirteenth case is still pending, and Mrs. Al-
Arian will talk about that. 
In every case that has reached a resolution, the INS has lost: In 
the three cases that reached Federal court resolution, Federal 
courts have declared the use of secret evidence unconstitutional, 
and the INS has basically chosen not to pursue its appeals. The 
only appeal it has chosen to pursue is with respect to Mr. 
Kiareldeen, and there the only argument it is making on appeal is 
that the case should be dismissed as moot, because Mr. Kiareldeen 
is now released, not that the underlying decisio~ was wrong. 
Yet it continues to engage in the practice. In all the cases that 
did not reach Federal court, immigration judges ruled against the 
INS, rejecting claims that national security was in fact at stake, 
after considering the evidence. Now, it is a rare thing, as you know, 
for a judge to stand up to a Federal Government claim of national 
security. The fact that judges have done so in so many cases re-
flects both the due process concerns that this practice raises and 
the Government's failure to reserve the tool for the most egregious 
cases. . 
In my written statement, I have illustrated in detail the dangers 
of secret 'evidence by talking about these specific cases. Here I just 
want to touch on some of the most fundamental problf'Tl'ls, first by 
focusing on a single case, Nassar Ahmed. Put yourself ~;J the shoes 
of Nassar Ahmed, an Egyptian citizen living here for 10 years with 
three U.S. citizen children, put in deportation pro~eedings because 
he overstayed his visa. 
But he has a strong case for asylum because he faces persecution 
if returned to Egypt. He shows up for a routine immigration hear-
ing and he is suddenly taken into custody, told he is a threat to 
national security. He says, why? The INS says, we can't tell you, 
because disclosing anything, even summarizing the charges against 
you, would itself jeopardize national security. 
How do you defend yourself? In an ordinary immigration case, he 
would have the right to know the charges against him. In these 
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proc~edin.gs, he had no right even to a summary. In an ordinary 
1ll)ougratlOn case, he would have the right to cross-examine wit-
nesse~. In secret evidence proceedings, you don't even know who 
the WItnesses are, much less can you cross-examine them. And in-
dee~, the Government declined even to tell the immigration judge 
behin~ closed ~oors who the. witnesses we.re, and declined to bring 
the WItnesses In to be questIoned by the Judge. They said, rely on 
our FBI agent's summary of what they have said. 
In an ordinary immigration case, you have the right to object to 
the admission of evidence. Well, how c(,n you object to the admis-
sion of evidence when it is being submitted behind closed doors? 
In short, secret evidence short-circuits the adversary process. 
That is why three Federal courts, the only three Federal courts 
that have addressed this issue in the last decade, and I represented 
the aliens in all those cases, have declared that the use of secret 
evidence is unconstitutional. _ 
Mr. Alexander said, aliens don't have a full panoply of due pmc-
ess rights, and citizens do, as if there is kind of a deluxe version 
of due _process rights, and then a basic version of due process 
rights. Well, there is no case that supports that proposition. But 
even if there were, what right could be more basic under due proc-
ess than the right to see the evidence against you? 
Now, beyond the basic, general problems with the use of secret 
evidence that the courts have recognized, I want to talk about the 
Yarticular problems raised by the way the INS has used this. And want to particularly respond to the assurances you have had 
about how they engaged in very careful review. 
First of all, there is no requirement in the law that this practice 
be reserved for persons who truly threaten national security. The 
only requirement in the law is that the information be classified, 
and of course, you know, millions of pages of information are classi-
fied every day, and that the information be relevant to the immi-
gration proceeding. Not that it shows that the alien is a thceat to 
national security, but merely that it be relevant. They can use it 
any time it is relevant. They have used it in cases where the INS's 
own actions indicate no threat to national security. 
In one of the earliest cases I did, the case of the Los Angeles 
Eight, in 1987, the INS sought to detain eight immigrants on se-
cret evidence at the same time than then-FBI Director William 
Webster was testifying before this Congress that the FBI had de-
termined that none of the individuals had engaged in any criminal 
or terrorist activity whatsoever, that they were arrested solely for 
their political affiliations and that if they were U.S. citizens, there 
would be no grounds for their arrest. . 
Moreover, in all 12 of the cases in which the INS has lost and 
we have prevailed and the aliens have been freed, the Government 
has declined to pursue all of its appeals. Now, if a true threat to 
national security were presented, wouldn't you expect the INS to 
pursue all of its appeals? But instead, it has repeatedly dropped 
the case, allowed the alien who it was claiming posed a threat to 
national security to be released into the community and not even 
taken all the steps that it could take. . 
Secondly, summaries. There is no requirement under the law 
that a summary be provided. There is also no requirement that if 
... __ .- ---
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a summary be provided that it be meaningful. When Mr. Ahmed 
was first detained, he received no summary whatsoever. At a later 
point in his hearing, the INS used secret evidence again. The only 
summary they would give him then was, you are associated with 
a known terrorist org.qnization. They wouldn't even tell him the 
group. 
Now, how do you defend yourself against that? When we filed a 
constitutional challenge, all of a sudden the INS found itself able 
to disclose the name of the group and 50 pages of previously classi-
fied information. 
And that brings me to the third point. The INS often uses this 
procedure where the evidenCE> does not need to be kept secret, be-
cause it was improperly classified. The Iraqi Six, represented by 
former CIA Director, Jim Woolsey. Initially, the Government said 
they had to be kept out because they were threats to national secu-
rity and all the evidence against them was secret. Well, then Jim 
Woolsey took the case, came here, brought a lot of attention to it, 
went on 60 Minutes, and all of a sudden, the INS was able to dis- . 
close 500 pages of what it previously said could not possibly be dis-
closed without threatening and jeopardizing national security. In 
Mr. Ahmed's case, the same thing happened. ' 
Fourth, this ability to use secret evidence leads the INS to rely 
on very questionable evidence. In Mr. Kiareldeen's case, which we 
have heard aboyt, and he is here, once a threat to national secu-
rity, now sitting right here, because the INS did not deem him a 
serious enough threat to pursue its appeals, even though it deemed 
him a serious enough threat to hold him in jail on the basis of se-
cret evidence for 19 months. 
In his case, the evidence primarily came from his ex-wife who 
was in a custody dispute with him, who it was established had 
made repeated - - . 
Mr. SMITH. Professor Cole, I am going to interrupt you for a 
minute. We have been generous with other witnesses this morning 
and let them go a minute or so past the customary 5 minute limit. 
You are almost doubling that limit. 
Mr. COLE. Well, if I could just conclude. 
Mr. SMITH. Please, thank you. 
Mr. COLE. Just one other example of questionable evidence. In 
the Nassar Ahmed case, one of the arguments that the FBI agent 
made behind closed doors, and which was classified as secret, was 
that because the INS had imprisoned Mr. Ahmed, it had increased 
his stature in the community and therefore he should not be re-
leased. 
The strongest argument against the use of secret evidence is that 
it is fundamentally·unfair. But it is also unnecessary. We can't do 
it in criminal proceedings, and aU the references to CIPA pre-
viously I think were quite misleading. CIPA does not permit intro-
duction of secret evidence in criminal proceedings. It couldn't, be-
cause of the sixth amendment. 
No matter how serious the crime is, we can't do it. And we have 
survived as a Nation for <:> 3 years, and I think we are better for 
it, for having honored the basic right to see the evidence against_ 
us. We can continue to survive honoring that right. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:] 
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PREPARED STATEM_~NT OF DAVID COLE.J. PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAw 
vENTER 
INTRODUCTION -
Mr. Chairman, me~bers of the Committee, I thank you for inviting me to testify 
on the use. of secr~t evi~ence i';l ~gration proceedings.! I have an unfortunately _. 
long expenence WIth this practIce. Smce 1987, I have represented 13 aliens against 
whom the INS has sought to use secret evidence. At one time, the INS claimed that 
all 13 posed a direct threat to the security of the nation, and that the evidence to 
support ~hat a<tljertion .could ~o~ be re~ealed-in !Dany ~tances could not even be 
summanzed - WIthout Jeopardizmg natlOnal secunty .. Yet m none of these cases did 
the INS's secret evidfJDC6 even allege, much less provp., that the aliens had engaged 
in or sUJ'ported II:ny criminal. much less terrorist. activity. In most cases. the ~ov­
emment s allegatIons. once revealed, consisted of no more than guilt by association: 
it claimed that the aliens were associated with disfavored "terrorist" groups. but not 
that they actually engaged in or furthered any terrorist activity themselves. 
Today, one of the 13 remains in prison as his case is still pending. All the other 
clients are free. living a law-abiding and peaceable existence here in the United 
States. without any adverse consequences to the security of the nation. In every case 
that has reached a final determination. the INS has lost. Where the caE'es have been 
resolved in the federal courts. the courts have declared the use of secret evidenr.e 
unconstitutional. Where the cases have been resolved in the immigration process 
immigration judges have uniformly rejected the government's national securitY 
claims as unwarranted. 
In the meantime. however. substantial harm has been done. Nasser Ahmed. an 
Egyptian man living in New Yl'rk, spent 3 and 0 years of his life incarcerated. most 
of it in solitary confinement. before his release last November. when the Attorney 
General declined to overrule the Board of Immigration Appeals' ruling that he did 
not pose a threat to national security and should be released. Hany Kiareldeen. a 
Palestinian from New Jersey/ .spent a year and a half in detention before the BIA 
and a federal Court ordered nis release in October 1999. And Mazen Al Najjar. a 
Palestinian from Tampa. Florida whose case is still pending. this week will pass his 
l000th day in captivity. without criminal charges and on the basis of evidence he 
has never seen. 
But it is not simply years of human beings' lives that have been lost. More broad-
ly. America's image as a country that cares about fairness. openness. and dutl proc-
ess has been seriously tarnished. Secret evidence is a tactic one associates with to-
talitarian regimes and military juntas. not free democracies. A remedy is needed, 
and H.R. 2121 is it. ..
The use of secret evidence poses insuperable challenges to the administration of justice. First, and most fundamentally, it is simply not possible to hold a fair adver-
sary proceeding where one side presents its eVIdence behind closed doors. The ad-
versary process is the best mechanism for detennining the truth that we have yet 
identified. but it depends on each side being able to examine and respond to the 
- other's evidence. Accordingly, every court to address ~he use of secret evidence in 
immigration proceedings in the last decade has declared it unconstitutional. 
Second. the INS's use of secret evidence contains practically no safeguards against 
abuse. It uses secret evidence against ~ple who do not pose any threat to the na-
tionaJ security. because in its view eVIdence can be submitted behind dosed doors 
whenever it is classified and relevant, even if the individual involved does not him· 
self pose a threat to national security. It uses secret evidence where there is no le-
gitimate need for the evidence to be secret. because it has been improperly classified 
by another at::ency and the INS has no authority to declassify. It uses secret evi-
dence where It has no affinnative statutory authority to do so. such as in detaining 
aliens without bond. It has failed to keep any record of many _of its secret evidence 
presentations, thereby defeating meaningful review. And while the INS has occa-
sionally provided aliens with declassified summaries of its secret eVIdence. neither 
statute nor regulation requires such a production. nor that the sunmtary provided 
afford the alien a meaningful opportunity to respond. Accordingly. summaries are 
often not provided at all. and when provided, are often so general as to be entirely 
unhelpful. 
1 I speak here in my personal capacity. and not as a representative of Georgetown University 
Law Center or any other entity or person. I attach my curriculum vitae as Exhibit A. Pursuant 
to House Rule XI. clause 2(g)(4), I hereby disclose that in the past three yeartl I received a $2500 
honorarium for speaking at a Justice Department conference. and $300 each year from the Ad-
ministrative Office for U.S. Court3 for conducting an /Ulnual training session for U.S. mag-
istrates. 
/ 
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Third, reliance on secret -evidence that cannot be challenged by one's adversarIes 
leads the government to engage in sloppy practices that would never be tolerated 
were it required to make its case in open court. Ai!, far as I can determine, the INS 
has relied almost entirely on hearsay presentations by FBI agents, and has failed 
t.o produce any original declarants, even in the closed-door proceedings. The FBI 
agents' presentations have sometimes taken the form of barebones assertions, not 
even providing the judge with sufficient information to make an independent assess-
ment of the reliability of or basis for the allegations. And the INS and FBI have 
relied on innuendo and rumor, even where its own records raise serious questions 
about the validity of its charges. 
Fourth, there has never been any showing that the use of secret evidence is nec-
essary. In no other setting is the government permitted to deprive someone of his 
liberty without affording him a meaningful opportunity to respond to the evidence 
against him. In criminal cases, secret evidence is never permitted, no matter how 
serious the charges, and no matter how much confidential or classified information 
the government has implicating the defendant. This rule applies to the prosecution 
of terrorists, spies, and mass murderers. We have survived as a nation for over 200 
years abiding by that basic rule of due process. There is no reason we cannot and 
should not extend the same rule to immigrants when we seek to deprive them of 
their liberty and either imprison them or deport them. 
Finally, the use of secret evidence is counterproductive. It poisons the truth-find-
ing process, so we cannot even be certain of whether we have properly identified 
threats to national security. It embroils the government in protracted litigation be-
cause the adversary process is ill-suited to this practice. And most problematically, 
. it encourages cynicism, paranoia, and distrust in immigrant communities, because 
closed-door proceedings understandably make people fear the worst. That paranoia 
and distrust in turn impedes the ability of law enforcement to identify true threats 
in immigrant communities, because it means that the FBI and INS will be viewed 
as enp-my rather than protector. 
I support H.R. 2121 because it seeks to end this practice. It would repeal existing 
statutory aut~ority for the use of secret evidence to deport aliens, to deny them re-
lief from depoltation, or to detain them. Its premise is that the practice cannot be 
mended, and therefore should simply be ended. I agree with that premise, because 
at bottom the use of secret evi-:lpl"!~:) cannot be ~quared with the due process guaran-
tee of notice and a fair hearing. In this testimon~', I will show why that is so as 
a matter of constitutiQnal law and i~lustrate "::lY it in so by pointing to the INS's 
dismal track record in secret evidence cas"". 
I. A CASE STUDY 
I want to begin with a case study. Hany Kiareldeen is a thirty-one year old Pal-
estinian who came to the United States on a student visa in 1990 and lives in New-
ark, New Jersey. From March 1998 to October 1999, he spent 19 months in prison 
solely on the basis of secret evidence-an uncorroborated bare-bones hearsay re-
port-that neither he nor his lawyers ever have had an opportunity to see. 
- In 1997, Kiareldeen applied for adjustment of status to permanent resident based 
on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. On March 26, 1998, however, without ruling on 
his application for permanent resident status, the INS arrested Kiareldeen, charged 
him with being deportable for failing to maintain his student visa status, and took 
him into custody as a threat to national security. 
Kiareldeen has never seen the only evidence that the INS ever offered to justify 
his detention, because the INS presented it in camera and ex parte. According to 
the undisputed claims of the immigration judges who reviewed it, however, the se-
cret evidence consisted of a report prepared by an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 
relaying extremely general hearsay allegations. Declassified summaries of the evi-
dence provided to Kiareldeen disclosed three allegations: (1) that Kiareldeen was'lS-
sociated with an unidentified "terrorist organization," and "maintains relationships" 
with other members and "suspected members" of "terrorist organizations," also un-
identified; (2) that '"[an unidentified] source advised" that about a week before the 
World Trade Center ("WTC") bombin~, Kiareldeen hosted a meeting at his residence 
in Nutley, New Jersey, where some mdividuals discussed plans to bomb the World 
Trade Center; and (3) that "[an unidentified] source advised Kiareldeen expressed 
a desire to murder Attorney General Janet Reno." The INS never introduced any 
evidence in open court to substantiate any of these allegations. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 
1999 WL 956289, *15 CD.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999). 
The immigration judge handling Kiareldeen's case initially ruled, in May 1997, 
that the government's secret evidence justified his detention as a security threat. 
At that time, the INS told Kiareldeen only that the evidence showed that he was 
4'1 
associated with terrorists and posed a threat to the Attorney General, charges so' 
general that he could not possibly rebut them. 
After Kiareldeen obtained more detailed summaries of the evidence, he did rebut 
t~fJ ~o"ernment's case in open court. He proved, for example, that he did not even 
hve ill the apartment where he supposedly met with World Trade Center bombers 
until a year and a half after the alleged meeting took place. (The FBI's own records 
confirmed this fact.) He also showed that one of the sources of secret evidence 
against him, his ex-wife, had made numerous false allegations against him in the 
course of a custody battle over their child. Kiareldeen sought to examine his ex-wife 
in open court, but the INS vigorously opposed his attempts to do so, and she refused 
to testify about her discussions with the FBI. 
Seven immigration judges ultimately examined Kiareldeen's case on the complete 
record, including the government's secret evidence presentation and Kiareldeen's 
open court rebuttal-the judge whu conducted the immigration hearing and two sep-
arate three-judge panels of the Board of Immigration Appeals. It is rare for any 
judge-even an Article III judge-to reject to a claim of national security by the fed-
eral government. Yet in this case, all seven judges flatly rejected the government's 
contention that Kiareldeen posed a threat to national security. 
Two judges directly discussed the quality of the government's evidence. The Immi-
gration Judge who presided at trial, Daniel Meisner, stated that Kiareldeen had 
"raised formidable doubts about the veracity of the· allegations contained in the 
[classified informationl," and that in the face of repeated requests for more informa-
tion, the INS had refused "to answer those doubts with any additional evidence, be 
it at the public portion of the hearing or even in camera." Matter of Kiareldeen, 
A77-025-332, Decision of Immigration Judge (Apr. 2, 1999). He concluded that the 
classified evidence was "too meager to provide reasonable grounds to believe that 
[Kiareldeenl was actually involved in any terrorist activity." [d. 
BIA Judge Anthony Moscato, dissenting from a preliminary bond panel decision 
not to release Kiareldeen, wrote that the bare-bones character of the government's 
in camera evidence made it "impossible" for the BIA to exercise independent judg-
ment in assessing "either the absolute truth or the relative probity of the evidence 
cC'ita;ned in the classified information." Matter of Kiareldeen, A77-025-332, Deci-
sion of BIA Denying Request to Lift Stay of Release Order (June 29, 1999) (Moscato, 
J., dissenting). Judge- Moscato criticized the INS for having provided no original 
source material and "little in the way of specifics regarding the source or context 
of the classified information." [d. He further noted that despite the immigration 
judge's continuing requests, the INS had provided "no witnesses, neither confiden-
tial informant nor federal agent, to explain or document the context of the actions 
and statements referenced in the classified information or to document the way in 
which the classified information became known to the source of that information." 
[d. at 1-2.2 
On August 18, 1999, Kiareldeen filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district 
court in New Jersey, arguing that the use of secret evidence to deprive him of his 
liberty pending resolution of the deportation proceedings was both unauthorized by 
statute and unconstitutional. On October 20, 1999, the district court granted the pe-
tition and issued a writ of habeas corpus. The court ruled that the INS's reliance 
on secret evidence violated Kiareldeen's due process right to a fair hearing, finding 
that "reliance on secret evidence raises serious issues about the integrity of the ad-
versarial proceSf, the impossibility of self-defense against undisclosed charges, and 
the reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted in darkness." 
Kiareldeen v. Reno, 1999 WL 956289, "'11 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999). The court also 
ruled that Kiareldeen had been deprived of his due process rights because the secret 
evidence at issue consisted of uncorroborated hearsay that "could not be tested for 
reliability" and did not allow the immigration judges "to conduct a meaningful ad-
ministrative review." [d. at "'14-18. The court ordered Kiareldeen'fl immediate re-
lease. 
Later the same day, a three-judge bond panel of the BIA also ordered Kiareldeen's 
release, unanimously rejecting the INS's appeal of the immigration judge's decision 
to grant bond, and lifting its prior preliminary stay of Kiareldeen's release. Five 
days earlier, on October 15, 1999, a separate three-judge merits panel had unani-
mously affirmed t11e immigration judge's decision granting Kiareldeen permanent 
2 The other two judges on this panel declined to lift the stay of Kiareldeen's release order 
pending appeal, but did not dispute in any respect Judge Moscato's characterization of the evi-
dence. 
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resident status, also finding that Kiareldeen had successfully rebutted the INS's 
charges against him. a 
After obtaining temporary stays of Kiareldeen's release from the Attorney General 
and a Third Circuit judge, the INS decided, on October 25, 1999, not to pursue fur-
ther appeals ~vailable to it, and released Kiareldeen. The .INS apparently concluded, 
after contendmg for more than a year and a half that Kiareldeen posed a national 
security threat, that he did not even pose a sufficient threat to justify pursuing its 
appeals. Kiareldeen is now a permanent resident alien) but has never received even 
an apology from the INS for taking a year and a half or his liberty from him. 
Kiareldeen's case is just one of many stories that could be told. I will now turn 
to the range of legal and practical problems raised by the INS's use of secret evi-
dence. 
n. THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS 
The use of secret evidence denies an alien the most basic guarantees of due proc-
ess: notice of the evidence against him and a meaningful opportunity to rebut it . 
. Accordingly, every court to address the issue in the last decade has found this prac-
tice unconstitutional. 4 
As the Supreme Court has stated: 
Certain prinl'iples have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. 
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, 
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings t the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the inaividual so that he 
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 496. "'Fairness can rarely be obtained i:ly secret, one-
sided determination of facts decisive of rights.'" Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 
(1975) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
Accordingly, even in ordinary civil litigation where physical liberty is not at stake, 
"it is . .'. the firmly held malO rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of 
a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions." Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 
F.2d 1043, 1061 CD.C. Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); see also Kinoy v. Mitchell, 
67 F.R.D. I, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (refusing to grant summary judgment on the basis 
of materials submitted in camera, because "[oJur system of justice does not encom-
pass ex parte determinations on the merits of cases in civil liti~dtion"). "[T]he very 
foundatIOn of the adversary process assumes that use of undIsclosed information 
will violate due process," and therefore "use of undisclosed information in adjudica-
tions should be presumptively unconstitutional." American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee v. Reno, (ADC v. Reno), 70 F.3d 1045, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1995).5 
Applying these principles, a federal district court recently declared unconstitu-
tional the use of secret evidence to detain aliens without bond. In Kiareldeen v. 
Reno, 1999 WL 956289 CD.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999), the district court granted habeas cor-
pus relief to an alien who had been detained by INS on the basis of secret evidence 
allegedly demonstrating that he was a threat to national security. As noted above, 
the court found that "reliance on secret evidence raises serious doubts about the in-
tegrity of the adversarial process, the impossibility of self-defense against undis-
closed charges, and the reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted 
in darkness." [d. at *11. 
3 Under the BINs rules, separate panels consider appeals of bond determinations and appeals 
of the merits of deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §3.19(d); 8 U.S.C. § 1226; Gornika v. INS, 681 
F.2d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 1982). 
4 The Due Process Clause protects all persons living in this country, whether citizen or alien. 
It protects even aliens living here unlawfuJly: 
There are IiteraJly millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth 
Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from 
deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one whose presence in 
this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Leng 
May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (958) ("our immigration laws have long made a distinc-
tion between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission ... and those who 
are within the United States after an entl{', irrespective of its legality."); Galvan v. Press, 347 
U.S. 522, 530 (1954) ("since he is a 'person, an alien has the same ,Rrotection for his life, liberty 
and property under the Due Process Clause as is afforded a citizen. ). 
6 A later decision in ADe v. Reno, addressing a separate selective prosecution claim, was re-
versed and vacated by the Supreme Court under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act, Reno v. American·Nab Anti·Discrimination Comm., U.S. __ , 
119 S. Ct. 936 (1999), but that decision had no bearing on the 1995 decision's hOlding on the 
use of secret evidence. 
'. 
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The Court in Kiareldeen followed the two most recent federal appellate court deci-
sions reviewing INS attempts to use secret evidence in immigration proceedings, 
both of which also held the/ractice unconstitutional. In 1988, the INS asserted na-
tional security concerns an sought to rely on secret evidence of Fouad Rafeedie's 
alleged high-ranking membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine (PFLP), an allegedly terrorist group, to exclude him from the country upon 
his return from a trip abroad. A district court preliminarily enjoined the INS's ac-
tions on due process grounds, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the injunction. Rafeedie 
v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 
880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989). On remand, the district court granted summary judg-
ment and held that the INS's attempt to rely on secret evidence violated due proc-
ess. Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. SUfP. 13 (D.D.C. 1992). The INS chose not to appeal, 
and abandoned its effort to expe Rafeedie. 
In Rafeedie, every judge to review the INS's actions found "'the government's 
basic position . . . profoundly troubling.''' Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 525 (Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, J., concurring). The district court found that such a procedure "afford[sl 
virtually none of the procedural protections designed to minimize the risk that the 
government may err.' Rafeedie, 795 F. Supp. at 19. The court of app~als compared 
the position of an alien having to disprove charges based on secret information to 
that of Joseph K. in Franz Kafka's The Trial, and stated that ''lilt is difficult to 
imagine how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden." 
Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 516. 
in 1995, the Ninth Circuit unanimously held that the INS could not constitu-
tionally rely on undisclosed information to deny legalization, an immigration bene-
fit, to two aliens accused of associating with a terrorist organization. ADC v. Reno, 
70 F.3d at 1066-71. The Ninth Circuit held that "[olnly the most extraordinary cir-
cumstances could support one-sided process." Id. at 1070. The fact that the govern-
ment asserted national security and charged aliens with membership in a terrorist 
organization was not sufficient to justify reliance on secret evidence. [d. Again, the 
government chose not to pursue further appeals, and granted the aliens legalization. 
These cases in turn followed Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), 
in which the Supreme Court relied on due process concerns to interpret an INS reg-
ulation not to permit the use of secret evidence to exclude aliens who live here and 
have due process protections. Chew was a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States who had left the country for four months as a seaman on a merchant vessel. 
Upon his return, he was threatened with permanent exclusion based on an immi-
gration regulation that allowed the exclusion of aliens on the basis of confidential 
information without a hearing. To avoid a "constitutional conflict" with the Due 
Process Clause, the Supreme Court construed the regulation not to apply to return-
ing lawful resident aliens, who have due process rights. Id. at 600-03. . 
These cases establish a simple propOSItion: the use of secret evidence cannot be 
squared with due process. It makes a mockery of the adversary process. Ordinarily, 
aliens have a right to confront all the evidence against them, and to cross-examine 
the government's witnesses. In secret evidence proceedings, the alien cannot cross-
examine, and often has no idea even of what the charges against him are. Ordi-
narily, aliens can object to the introduction of evidence in immigration proceedings; 
where evidence is produced in secret, the alien cannot make any objections, because 
he cannot know what the evidence consists of. Ordinarily, an alien is provided with 
notice of the ch.a~ges agains~ him; in a ~ecret evidence proceeding he is not. In short, 
all of the reqUISItes of' a faIr adversanal process are abandoned when the govern-
ment is free to introduce its evidence behind closed doors. 
The government generally cites three cases in arguing that it is constitutional to 
use secret evidence in deportation proceedings. None provides the supPort the gov-
ernment seeks. The first, Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), expressly disclaimed any 
constitutional holding. The case presented only a statutory challenge to the use of 
secret evidence to deny suspension of deportation as a matter of discretion, and the 
Court expressly noted that the alien had presented no constitutional challenge. Jay, 
351 U.S. at 357 n.21. Quite plainly, a case that does not even present a constitu-
tional claim cannot resolve that claim. The other two cases the government cites, 
from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, engage in virtually no constitutional analysis. 
They each dismiss the due process issue in a paragraph by misreading Jay v. Boyd 
as if it decided the constitutional issue, wholly disregarding the fact that the Court 
in Jay explicitly said it was not deciding that issue.s 
6United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 873 (1974); Suciu v. INS, 755 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1985). Indeed, the court in Suciu 
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Ill. THE INS'S USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS DEVOID OF MEANINGFUL SAFEGUARDS 
The basic due process problem with relying on secret evidence is exacerbated by 
the fact that the INS's regulations and procedures contain no meaningful safeguards 
against its abuse. And as the INS's track record illustrates, the abuses have been 
endemic. 
A. The Use of Secret Evidence is Not Restricted to Individuals Posing a Threat to 
National Security 
First, the INS does -not limit its use of secret evidence to national security risks. 
Its regulations permit it to use this extraordinary procedure anytime that it has 
classified evidence relevant to an application for an immigration benefit. If the INS 
had classified evidence that an indiVIdual's marriage was not bona fide, for example, 
an issue that in itself poses no security concern, its regulations would nonetheless 
permit it to present that evidence behind closed doors. There is no requirement that 
It first attempt to make its case without relying on secret evidence. And most prob-
lematically, there is no requirement that it limit its use of this procedure to individ-
uals who truly pose a threat to national security, such as, for example, individuals 
who have committed or were planning to commit criminal conduct threatening na-
tional security. \ -
Accordingly, the INS used secret evidence in 1997 to oppose Imad Hamad's appli-
cation for permanent resident status, even though its evidence (which it subse-
quently disclosed because it was improperly classified), showed no more than that 
Hamad had attended a Palestinian dinner/dance, on the basis of which the INS ar-
gued that he was associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation -of Palestine. 
Both an immigration judge and the BIA held that this evidence did not support de-
nying Mr. Hamad adjustment of statushand the INS did not pursue further appeals. 
Mr. Hamad now lives in Dearborn, Mic igan. -
More frequently, the INS maintains that individuals pose a threat to national se-
curity when the INS's own subsequent actions make clear that the evidence simply 
does not support the charge. Thus, in 1987, the INS arrested eight aliens in Los 
Angeles, charged them as deportable for being members of a group that advocated 
world communism, and sought to detain them as national security threats on secret 
evidence. When the immigration judge refused to take evidence in camera and ex 
parte, the INS simply allowed the eight to go free, belying its national security 
claims. At the same time, then-FBI Director William Webster testified that an FBI 
investigation had found no evidence of terrorist or criminal ~onduct on the part of 
any of the eight, that they were arrested for their political affiliations with the Pop-
ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and that if they had been U.S. 
citizens, there would have been no basis for their alTest. 7 Thus, in this case the gov-
ernment sought to use secret evidence at the same time that it admitted that the 
individuals had engaged in no criminal or terrorist activity. Later in the same case, 
the INS again tried to use secret evidence to deny two of the eight aliens legaliza-
tion under an amnesty law. The district court examined the evidence i1l camera and 
found that it demonstrated nothing other than First Amendment-protected activi-
ties. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, ]069-70 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (discussing district court finding and noting that the government's claims 
of national security were premised not on any individual conduct but on general as-
sertions about the PFLP). _ 
Similarly, the INS initially claimed that Fouad Rafeedie posed a threat to na-
tional security because he was a high-ranking member of the PFLP, it allowed him 
to remain free on parole, thus undermining its own claims. And when a district 
court granted summary judgment against the INS and held both its use of secret 
evidence and a provision of the INA unconstitutional, the government did not pur-
sue further appeals, even though there is a strong presumption in favor of appealing 
decisions declaring statutes unconstitutionaL Mr. Rafeedie now lives a peaceful and 
law-abiding existence in Texas. 
Imad Hamad, yet another man accused of posing a national security threat, is 
also a permanent reside'lt today. A Palestinian living in Michigan, he was also 
charged with being associated with the PFLP, again on the basis of secret evidence. 
The immigration judge reviewed the evidence, but found nothing in it that war-
acknowledged that "as a matter of fairness and logic, the [due process} argument has consider-
able appeal," but then erroneously considered it "foreclosed" by Jay v. Boyd. [d. 
7 Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Nomination of William 
H. Wt'bster, to be Director of Central Intelligence, 100th Cong., 1st Se~s. 94, 95 (April 8, 9, 30, 
1987; May 1, 1987), quoted in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 
1053 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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ranted denying Hamad's application for permanent resident status. On appeal, the 
BlA affirmed, and the INS did not seek further review by the Attorney General. 
As detailed above, the INS never charged Hany Kiareldeen with any criminal ac-
tivitr despite claiming that he posed a threat to national security. All seven judges 
to VIew the complete record in his case found no basis for the government's claim 
that he posed a national security threat, and the INS then declined to pursue its 
appeals Nasser Ahmed spent 3 and 1/2 years detained, ostensibly as a threat to na-
tional security. 
When an immigration judge and the BlA both ruled in 1999 that Nasser Ahmed 
an Egyptian man who had been imprisoned for 3 and 1/2 years, should be released 
because the INS's evidence did not show that he posed a threat to national security, 
the INS initially sought Attorney General review. At the eleventh hour, however, 
minutes before the deadline the Attorney General set for herself to decide whether 
Ahmed should go free or continue to be detained, the INS withdrew its request for 
Attorney General review. Quite. plainly, the Attorney General was not convinced 
that Ahmed actually posed a national security threat. 
The only person I represent who is still detained on the basis of secret evidence 
is Mazen Al N!\i.:iar. We have just filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf, and 
the case is still being briefed. But in his case, too, there are strong reasons to doubt 
the government's claims of national security. First, AI N!\i.:iar remained a free man 
until his deportation hearing concluded, yet the INS has never explained why he 
became a threat to national security only after the hearing was complete. He has 
been the subject of grand jury investigations since at least January 1996, yet the 
government has filed no cnminal charges against him or those with whom he is as-
sociated. And the only reason that either the immigration judge or the BlA gave 
for detaining him as a national security threat was his alleged political association 
with a terrorist group-neither the immigration judge, the BlA, nor the INS itself 
has ever claimed that Al Najjar himself engaged in or supported any terrorist activ-
ity. Matter of Ai Najjar, A26-599-077, Bond Decision of Immigration Judge 6 (June 
23, 1997); Matter Of AI Najjar, A26-599-077, Bond Decision of BIA 12 (Sept. 15, 
1998). 
It is my view that the use of secret evidence to deprive an individual of his liberty 
or to acljudicate an alien's request to remain here is nearly always unconstitutional. 
But even if one believed that it could be used in extreme cases posing extreme dan-
gers, the INS regulations do not restrict it to such cases. On the contrary, the INS 
has repeatedly used secret evidence even where it lacks sufficient evidence to charge 
any cnminal conduct, much less criminal conduct threatening national security. 
B. The INS Often Uses Improperly Classified Evidence, and Only Declassifies it 
When Its Actions are Challenged 
Whatever one thinks of the validity of secret procedures where evidence is prop-
erly classified, we can.all agree that there is no justification for the procedure where 
evidence does not in fact need to be confidential. Yet the INS has repeatedly rre-
sented evidence in camera and ex parte that could and should have been disclosed 
from the outset. This is more the fault of the FBI, vi'.jch is generally the classifying 
agency, than the INS, but it is a critical problem wil .! 'lITent practices. 
For example, in 1998, the INS initially relied on s,.,·~t evidence to exclude several 
Iraqis who were accused of being double-agents after the United States airlifted 
them from Iraq on the heels of a failed coup atteJUpt against Saddam Hussein. 
When fonner Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey took their case on and 
brought substantial congressional and media pressure to bear on the INS, the gov-
ernment found that it was suddenly able to declassify over 500 pages of the pre-
viously secret evidence. 
Similarly, in Nasser Ahmed's case, the government initially took the position that 
it could not even provide a summary of any the secret evidence against him without 
jeopardizintr the national security. Yet when Ahmed filed a constitutional challenge 
to the INS s actions, it suddenly found itself able to provide a summary of many 
of its charges, and it eventually turned over more than 50 pages of declassified ma-
terial that had originally been submitted in secret. The fact that the INS was able 
to disclose the evidence indicates that there was no need to submit it in secret in 
the first place. Moreover, on its face much of the evidence could not possibly have 
been properly classified. One allegation, for example, maintained that Ahmed was 
associated with Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, but that was hardly a secret, as 
Ahmed had served as Sheikh Abdel Rahman's court-appointed paralegal and trans-
lator during the criminal trial of the Sheikh. Other evidence initially classified but 
ultimately disclosed revealed that the INS's witness in the in camera proceedings, 
an FBI agent, argued that Ahmed shovld be detained because his detention by INS 
had made him a hero in the Muslim community and his release would increase hiB 
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political stature. Matter of Ahmed, Decision of Immigration Judge and Declassified 
Excerpts from Classified Attachment (July 30, 1999). 
In still another case, that of Imad Hamad, it turned out that the "secret evidence" 
that the INS presented at Mr. Hamad's hearing in 199'/ had previously been pro-
duced publicly and disclosed to the alien at an earlier stage of the proceeding. When 
the INS learned of this, it "declassified" the document and submitted it as part of 
the open record when the case was on appeal to the BIA. Quite plainly, the docu-
ment never should have been classified. 
These cases illustrate an inherent structural problem. The evidence that the INS 
generally presents in secret is not classified by it, but by another agency, usually 
the FBI. If the FBI overclassifies, as it apparently did in the cases described above, 
the INS has no authority to second-guess the FBI's judgment. Nor does the immi-
gration judge. Moreover, when an FBI agent makes a decision to classifY, it is usu-
ally in the context of a counterterrorism investigation, where he is effectively weigh-
ing an abstract public right to know against the need for confidentiality of an inves-
tigation. In that situation, agents naturally err on the side of classifying. But when 
that evidence is then used to deprive an alien of his liberty, there is no requirement 
that anyone review the classification decision. In other worns, no one asks whether 
the classification decision might come out differently when the interest on the other 
side of the balance is not an abstract public right to know, but the very specific in-
terest of a human being seeking to regain his liberty .. 
This structural flaw can lead to years of wholly unnecessary detention. If Nasser 
Ahmed had been provided at the outset of his detention with the information he was 
ultimately given, he would have been able to put on his defense immediately, and 
he would presumably have been released in short order. Instead, when he was ini-
tially detained he was told that nothing could be revealed about the secret evidence, 
and the immigration authorities, denied any meaningful response from Ahmed, or-
dered his detention. Only after he had sat for years in prison diet the INS disclose 
what could and should have been disclosed at the outset. Thus, here the overc1assi-
fication literally cost a man years of his life. 
C. The INS Uses Secret Evidence Where it Ladt8 Statutory Authority to Do So 
One of the most common uses of secret evidence by INS is to justifY detaining 
an alien without bond while his deportation hearing is pending. This practice can 
and has resulted in the detention of aliens for (ears without ever seeing the evi-
dence against them, even where the only forma charge against them is that they 
overstayed their visa. Yet there is n<J statutory authorit:, for this practice. 
Congress has authorized the INS to use secret evid.:-nce in a variety of settings, 
and H.R. 2121 seeks to repeal much of that authority. Thus, the INA today author-
izes the use of secret evidence to deny various forms of relief from removal, to ex-
clude certain aliens, and to deport "alien terrorists." But the only statutory author-
ization to use secret evidence to detain an individual while his deportation proceed-
ings are pending is 8 U.s.C. § 1536(a)(2)(B) (1997), which applies only to "alien ter-
rorists" under special deportation hearings held in the Alien Terrorist Removal 
Court. The INS has never invoked the Alien Terrorist Removal Court procedures, 
but nonetheless has repeatedly used secret evidence to detain aliens not in these 
procedures, and not accused of bein¥ "alien terrorists." 
D. INS Regulations Do Not Require That the Alien be Provided a Meaningful Declas-
sified Summary of Secret Evidence __ 
INS regulations permit the use of secret evidence without even providing a sum-
mary of the evidence to the alien. While the regulations state that a summary 
should be provided when possible, there is no requirement that a summary be pro-
vided, or that the summary afford the alien a meaningful opportunity to respond. 
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(16) (1996), 242.17(a), (c)(4)(iv)(1996); 8 CFR 
§ 240. 11(c)(3)(iv) (1997). An alien may be told only that secret evidence shows that 
he must be detained, without even a hint as to what the evidence consists of or 
charges him with. That is the situation Nasser Ahmed faced when he was initially 
detained. The INS maintained that it could not tell him anything about the secret 
evidence whatsoever. In such a situation, it is literally impossible to present a de-
fense. 
Where summaries are provided, there is no requirement that they be meaningful. 
Thus, when Nasser Ahmed next faced secret evidence, in the course of his deporta-
tion hearing, the INS did give him a summary. But the summary consisted solely 
of the allegation that he had an "association with a known terrorist organization." 
Matter of Ahmed, Deportation Decision of Immir:ration Judge 20 (May 5, 1997) The 
INS would not even disclose the name of the group. The immigration judge correctly 
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characterized that summary as "largely uselesst" id., but the regulations imPQBe no 
requirement that the summaries meet any stanaard whatsoever. . 
. The use. o~ se.cret evidence virtually always makes a meaningful defense impos-
slble, but lt mdlsputably does so where the government does not give the alien no-
tice of the specific allegations af,fainst him. Yet in none of the cases in which I have 
been mvolved has the INS proVlded an adequate summary, and there is no regula-
tion or requirement in place to ensure that it do so. 
E. The INS Has Failed to Keep Recordll of Its Secret Evidence Presentations Thereby 
Defeating Meaningful Review ' 
I?nally, the INS has failed t? keep records of many of its secret evidence presen-
tabons. In Ahmed's and AI NalJar's cases, the immigration judges initially took evi-
dence in camera but made no record of the hearing. The absence of a record. of 
course, defeats any semblance of meaningful appellate review, particularly where 
the hearing was never open to the public 80 there is no check on government asser-
tions regarding what transpired. In these cases, the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
an appellate body, took new evidence outside the record and again ex parte and in 
camera, and based its decisions on that extra-record showing. 
III. SECRET PROCEDURES ENCOURAGE RELIANCE ON QUESTIONABLE EVIDENCE 
In open proceedings, each party's knowlodge that its evidence will be subjected 
to cross-examination and rebuttal by its adversary creates crucial incentives. It 
means that any ~ood advocate will test his or her evidence first, betore it is sub-
j~ted to testing m open court, and will n.ot rely on weak or questionable evidence. 
When one knows, by contrast, that the other side will never see the evidence, those 
checkl! do not operate. The INS's track record illustrates that secret procedures in-
vite abuse. 
First, the INS has relied heavily in its secret evidence presentations on hearsay, 
often in the form of reports drafted by FBI agents relaying accusations by hearsay 
sources. In the cases of Nasser Ahmed and Hany Kiareldeen the immigration judges harshly criticized the government for its reliance on doubie and triple hear-
say, its failure to provide sufficient information to permit an independent assess-
ment of the allegatIOns, and its failure, when questioned by the immigration judges, 
to produce any first-hand witnesses. In effect, it appears that the government 
sought to have the immigration judges simply defer to the judgment of its FBI wit-
ness that the alien posed a threat to national security. 
The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have held that relianre on hearsay 
in immigration proceedings~ while not absolutely prohibited, poses serious due proc-
ess.problems because it deteats the possibility of examining the witnesses. Bridges 
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.9 
(1974) (describing Bridges as holding that due process bars use of hearsay "as sub-
stantive evidence bearing on. . . A charge upon which a deportation order had been 
based"). Thus, many courts hold that the INS may not present hearsay unless it 
first shows that the ori~nal declarant is unavailable. See, e.g., Cunanan v. INS, 856 
F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Crr. 1988); Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 
1992); Dallo v. INS, 765 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1985); Kiareldeen, 1999 WL 956289, 
at *14-*18. Yet the INS relies heavily on hearsay in its secret evidence hearings, 
and as far as I know, has never made a showing that the original declarants are 
unavailable. The presentation of evidence in secret makes it impossible for the alien 
to cross-examine the witnesses against him. When the secret evidence consists of 
hearsay. it is impossible even for the judge to question the sources. 
Second~r~he INS has relied on extremely weak evidence in its secret presentations. 
In Hany ruareldeen's case, it appears to have relied principally on accusations made 
by Kiareldeen's ex-wife, who was in a custody dispute with Kiareldeen and had 
made repeated false accusations against him. Its evidence alleged that Kiareldeen 
had hosted a meeting at his Nutley, New Jersey apartment a year and a half before 
he even moved into the apartment. 
In Nasser Allmed's case, the FBI initially claimed in its secret evidence that 
Ahmed had disseminated to the press a letter from Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, 
who was then in prison, to the press. The letter complained of the Sheikh's prison 
conditions, but called for no violence. The FBI claimed in its secret evidence presen-
tation that the letter had nonetheless sparked a terrorist bombing in Egypt. Allmed 
denied disseminating the letter, and proved that many other persons could have 
done so. The FBI subsequently admitted that it had no idea who had disseminated 
the letter, and the State Department reported that the terrorist incident had noth-
ing to do with the Sheikh, but was a retaliatory attack for an Israeli bombing in 
Southern Lebanon. Matter of Ahmed, Deportation Decision of Immigration Judge 
and Declassified Excerpts from Classified Attachment (July 30, 1999). In Allmed's 
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case, the FBI agent also argued in secret hearings that Ahmed should be detained 
because the INS's detention of him had increased his stature in the Arab commu-
nity, and that as a result upon his release he would be a more effective leader. 1d. 
Finally, some of the secret evidence in Ahmed's case may have come from the E~­
tian government, the very country that the immigration judge found would impnson 
and likely torture Ahmed for his affiliations with Sheikh Abdel Rahman if Ahmed 
were returned there. 1d. 
These examples illustrate that one cannot short-circuit the adversary process 
without substantial costs, not only to the rights of those against secret evidence is 
used, but to the legitimacy of the truth-finding process itself. 
IV. THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS UNNECESSARY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
-
The government typically responds to the above concerns by claiming that the 
government's interest in national security, coupled with the pohtical branches' "ple-
nary power" over immigration matters, nonetheless justifies the use of secret evi-
dence. But there has never been any showing that national security in fact requires 
the use of secret evidence, and the government's track record strongly suggests that 
its identification of "national security" concerns is by no means trustworthy. 
As I noted at the outset, I have represented 13 aliens against whom the INS 
sought to use secret evidence. In all 13 cases, the INS claimed that national security 
would be threatened. In 12 of the 13 cases, the aliens are now living freely in the 
United States, after the INS lost in court and then decided not to pursue avenues 
of appeal available to it. The very fact that in these cases the INS did not even pur-
sue all of their appeals~ only underscores the weakness of the national security 
claim. If national security were genuinely at risk, one would expect the government 
to leave no stone unturned in its attempt to safeguard the nation. 
Even where national security concerns are bona fide, the use of secret evidence 
to deprive an alien of his liberty is unconstitutional. It is indisputable that secret 
evidence could never be used in a criminal case, whether the crime charged was es-
pionage, sabotage, or terrorism, and no matter how serious the national security 
concern. We have survived as a nation for over 200 years despite our adherence to 
that absolute principle. There is no reason to believe that adoption of a similar prac-
tice in deportation cases would pose any greater threat. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that it will not countenance the use of secret 
evidence, even where claims of national security are advanced, to deprive aliens liv-
ing here of their liberty. It refused to permit secret evidence in Kwong Hai Chew 
v. Colding, even though the Attorney General had personally determined that the 
information could not be disclosed without prejudicing the national interest. 344 
U.S. at 592. When faced with INS claims that labor organizer Harry Bridges's con-
tinued residence here was contrary to national security due to his associations with 
the Communist Party, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that hearsay could not 
be used to establish deportability because he must be afforded the opportunity to 
confront the evidence against him. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152, 156 (1945).8 
As Justice Frankfurter wrote, "[tlhe requirement of 'due process' is nota fair-weath-
er or timid assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trou-
ble." Joint Anti·Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 162. 
Finally, the use of secret evidence is counterproductive, even as a tool for fighting 
terrorism. It makes error all too likely, meaning that we may well focus on the 
wrong people. And more fundamentally, secrecy encourages distrust of government. 
And that distrust can itself impede law enforcement. Many aliens in Arab commu-
nities are deeply suspicious of federal agents now, and for good reason. Nearly all 
of the secret evidence cases of the past five years have involved Arab and/or Muslim 
aliens. If we believe that the Arab community is more likely to contain terrorists, 
a supposition that as Timothy McVeigh showed, is debatable, the last thing we 
should do is adopt tactics that make the entire community view law enforcement 
as the enemy. 
v. H.R. 2121 RESPONDS TO THE ABOVE CONCERNS BY REPEALING STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
TO USE SECRET EVlDENCE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS AND IN THE ADJUDICATION 
OF IMMIGRATION BENEFITS 
H.R. 2121 provides a direct and straightforward remedy to all of the above prob-
lems. It repeals statutory authority for the use of secret evidence in deportation pro-
ceedings and the adjudication of immigration benefits. If enacted, it would accord 
8 In enacting the deportation provision at issue in Bridges, Congress specifically found that 
the Communist Party posed a threat to national security. S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong .• 2d Sess. 
788-89(950). 
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to all aliens the fair procedures now provided to most. Because the use of secret evi-
dence is unconstitutional, unworkable, and unwise, I fully support this remedy. 
First, it would repeal authority for using secret evidence to deport aliens. That 
!lu~horio/ has .only existed since 1.996, !lnd ha~ nev~r bee~ ~nvoked by the INS, so 
It IS qwte plam that we can SUl"Vlve WIthout It. This proVlsion would simply place 
all aliens living here on equal footing in removal hearings. 
Second, it would repeal authority for the government to deny immigration benefits 
based on secret evidence. Currently, the INA authorizes the government to deny 
even asylum on the basis of secret evidence. In Nasser Ahmed's case, the immigra-
tion judge initially found that although Nasser Ahmed had shown his eligibility for 
asylum on the public record, because he would be imprisoned and very likely tor-
tured if returned to Egypt, his application had to be denied based on secret evidence 
that Ahmed never saw. , 
Third, the bill would make clear that aliens may not be detained on the basis of 
secret evidence while their removal proceedings are pending. As noted above, there 
is no existing affirmative statutory authority for this practice under current law out-
side the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, but the INS maintains that it has the au-
thority implicitly, and therefore it is wise to make clear that no such authority ex-
ists. 
Fourth, the bill would bar the government from using secret evidence to deny ad-
mission to returning permanent resident aliensl individuals paroled into the United St.ates, and asylum seekers at the border. The oar on use against returning ~erma­
nent residents is already supported by Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 
1992). Persons paroled into the Uhited States and asylum seekers under current law 
lack constitutional protection, but the use of secret evidence in these cases presents 
all the same problems that its use presents in proceedings against aliens who have 
entered the country, and accordingly I support this reform as well. _ 
CONCLUSION 
The defects of legal proceedings conducted in secret have been recognized for cen-
-turies. In the Bible itself provided that under Roman law, a man charged with 
criminal conduct should "have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer 
for himself concerning the crime laid a?,'ainst him."9 Similarly, Wigmore, the noted 
expert on evidence, has written that '[flor two centuries past, the policy of the 
Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by 
cross-examination as a vital feature of the law." 10 It would be difficult to identitY 
anything more as fundamental to a fair legal process than the right of each party 
to examine and confront th.e evidence against it. When we deny that right to aliens, 
we not only denigrate their rights, but demean our own system of justice. 
Mr. SMITH. Thank. you, Professor Cole. 
Mrs: AI-Arian. 
STATEMENT OF NAHLAAL-ARIAN 
Mrs. AL-ARIAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, thanks, Ms. Jackson Lee 
for inviting me today to talk about this very much needed issue 
and the secret evidence procedure. 
My name is Nahla AI-Arian, and I am a proud American citizen 
of Palestinian descent. I am also a mother of five, and the proud 
.sister of Dr. Mazen AI-Najjar, who's been deprived of his freedom 
for almost 1,000 days now because of the use of secret evidence. On 
May 19th, 1997, Mazen was handcuffed in front of his three young 
daughters and taken to a detention facility for supposedly a visa 
violation. We thought that he would be released on bail in a day 
or two, like thousands of many similar cases. 
However, our hopes were quickly dashed when the Government 
used secret evidence against him. The immigration judge in the 
hearing said that my brother is respectable socially, religiously and 
professionally and has strong family and community ties. He then 
9 Acts 25:16 (King James). 
10 5 Wigmore on EvUknce 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (quoted in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 
(1959». 
